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Abstract 
Transparency of companies’ activities with respect to board, financial and management of a firm 
and the relationship that exist between them is crucial because information disclosure solves the 
problem of information asymmetries and signaling of relevant material information to the 
stakeholders. This study examines the transparency and its relationship with performance of 
non-financial listed companies in Nigeria. The study adopts the panel data analysis (2010-2013) 
and relationship between transparency and firm performance. The research adopts the panel 
corrected standard errors (PCSEs) as a result of autocorrelation and heterocadesticity in the 
model. The findings of the study shows research which further concludes that transparency of 
relevant information can lead to firm performance as shown by the significant relationship 
(positive with Tobin’s Q and negative with ROA) of transparency of board and transparency in 
financial have positive relationship with Tobin’s Q. The implication for this study is that a public 
limited company should practice full disclosure of material information and to disclose more 
than the statutory minimum requirements. 





The corporate governance and financial reporting scandals that hit the whole world has led to a 
world adopting that sound corporate governance and code of best practices that will govern the 
company as a whole. These practices include transparency and full disclosure of material 
information in the annual report and (Aksu & Kosedag, 2006; C. Botosan, 1997; Chow & Wong-
boren, 1987; Meek, Robert, & Sidney, 1995).OECD(1999) states that full disclosure and 
transparency of financial information are important components of the corporate governance 
framework. Disclosure and transparency are important elements and an indicator of enhanced 
corporate governance (Aksu & Kosedag, 2006; Meek et al., 1995).  It is a fact that the decision of 
the company to engage in voluntary disclosure might be a response to innovation, 
internationalization, changes in business environments and changes in the capital market 
(Mohd Ghazali & Weetman, 2006). In another vein, Leuz and Verrecchia, (2001) proposed a 
framework of the impact of proprietary costs on disclosure. Less information will be disclosed by 
the Companies if that information affects the cash flows for the owners of the business. Another 
factor affecting proprietary costs is competition (Leuz & Verrecchia, 2001; Mohd Ghazali & 
Weetman, 2006). Accordingly, it is expected that “firms in less competitive industries are 
expected to disclose more information because the proprietary costs of disclosure for these 













In Nigeria, there are issues of transparency by companies as a result; the security and exchange 
commission have included transparency and disclosure in its framework of best practice in 2011. 
Company’s involvements in sharp practices in their affair have led to collapse of many 
organizations. Another one is the issue of companies been delisted from Nigerian Stock 
Exchange(NSE) as a result of lack of compliance with the relevant laws. This could be seen as 
problems of transparency. Table 1 shows the delisted companies between 2008 and 2013.  
 
Table 1: Summary of Delisted companies from 2008-2013 in NSE 
Year Regulatory Nationalization Voluntary Absorbed Merged Total 
2008 20 - 1 - - 21 
2009 11 - - - - 11 
2010 1 - 1 - - 2 
2011 11 3 3 1 3 21 
2012 3 - - - 3 3 
2013 2 - - - 2 4 
Total 49 3 5 1 8 65 
Source: Nigerian Stock Exchange Bulletin (2014) 
The objective of this study is to examine the relationship between the level of transparency and 
firm performance of public listed companies in Nigeria. The dimensions of transparency in this 
study is transparency in board, financial and management process following studies  (Aksu & 
Kosedag, 2006; Chiang, 2005; Meek et al., 1995). 
2. Signaling Theory 
According to Karasek and Bryant, (2012:19) “Signaling is all around us in our everyday lives. 
People signal by the way they carry themselves, speak and interact. Organizations signal as 
well in their advertisements, recruiting and annual reports, just to name a few” 
 
In this study, we consider the influence of Spence’s (1973) seminal article on signaling theory. 
False information between associated parties in business is reduced as a result of signaling 
(Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2010). The theory explains how firms or business 
organization uses their board to communicate to the shareholders, the extent of achievement, 
disclosure and compliance with relevant CG mechanism and financial reporting(Spence, 1973). 
We trace signaling theory’s impact on management, psychology and anthropology. We propose a 
model of the relationship among information and firm performance. Finally, we suggest areas of 
further research based on signaling theory. 
 
2.1 Mandatory Disclosure Requirement and Transparency 
In Nigeria, Company and Allied Matter Act (CAMA) (1990) section 334(2) states the mandatory 
disclosure requirements in the annual report which include: “a statement of accounting policy, 
the balance sheet as at the last day of the year, a profit and loss account or, in the case of a 
company not trading for profit, an income and expenditure account for the year, notes on the 
 
 








accounts and the auditor’s reports.” The following disclosures are statutorily required in the 
annual reports; these include accounting Standards, Directors’ Report and an Audit Committee. 
The sections of Company and Allied Matter Act (CAMA) (1990,) especially section 359(3)-(6) 
requires every limited company to constitute an audit committee and other relevant material 
disclosures. However, in Nigeria, regulatory and reporting framework is still developing. The 
Nigerian regulatory agencies such as NSE and Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) has set 
up a strong compliance and monitoring mechanism. Thus, in terms of mandatory disclosure of 
information, most of the listed companies in Nigeria have complied with the minimum level of 
disclosure required. Companies that have adopted the International Financial Reporting 
Standard (IFRS) are expected to be more transparent in their reporting (Edogbanya & 
Kamardin, 2014). 
2.2 Disclosure and Firm performance 
Traditionally, companies with good news would disclose more to their stakeholders than 
companies which had made losses. Chau and Gray(2002) in their research in Hong Kong and 
Singaporean companies found a positive association between disclosure and performance. 
Corporate transparency is highly associated with corporate performance and company with 
better corporate governance have very high standard of disclosure of material fact and 
transparency of the firm. There is an expectation of a positive relationship between better 
performing companies and corporate disclosure. However, Ball, Robin, and Wu, (2003); 
Clatworthy and John, (2006); Watson and Marston, (2002) provide evidence that performance 
and disclosure could result in negative relationship. However, Wallace and Naser (1995) posit 
negative relationships on the empirical study between disclosure and performance. Studies by 
Ahmed (1999) and Akhtaruddin (2005) fail to find significant relationship. According to the SEC 
2011, companies are required to disclose more than the requirements of CAMA and SEC. from 
the above explanations, the following hypotheses are developed.  
H1. There is a relationship between transparency of ownership structure and investments and 
Firm performance of non-financial companies in Nigeria 
H2   There is a relationship between financial transparency and Firm performance of non-
financial companies in Nigeria 
H3   There is a relationship between board and management structure and process and Firm 

















3. Research Framework and Methodology 









Fig 1.1: Conceptual Frame work 
4. Research Method 
As of the 31st December, 2013, there were a total of 192 companies, including (both financial 
and non-financial companies) listed on the NSE. The sample for this study is 62 non-financial 
companies out of 136 companies as shown in the table 2. Due to the unavailability of some 
company’s annual reports is the choice for this sample and also the lack of documented annual 
report by the regulatory agencies and most companies do not upload their annual report on the 
website of the companies.All financial companies are excluded from the sample because of 
difference in regulatory requirements. The data covers from 2010 to 2013 with variables that 
relates to disclosure and transparency. Information on the study variables was extracted from 
the published annual reports by the companies. We employ panel data to analyze the data. 
Multivariate regression is used to test for the hypotheses developed for this study. While the 
homoscedasticity and autocorrelation were checked to know the appropriate regression to use 
(Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). As a result of heteroscadacity and the autocorrelation issue in the 
regression model, the Panel Corrected Standard Errors is adopted for this study. 
Table 2: Sample Selection Method 
Non-financial companies identified from NSE, Nigeria web page in 2014 136 
Less:  
Delisted  companies 35 
Data not available in any year 27 
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4.1 Sample Profile 
Table 3 below shows the percentage sample composition of sectors used in this study. The 
sample cut across the industry groups making up the Nigerian economy, except the financial 
companies. The choice of only non-financial sector is as a result of regulatory differences of the 
financial sector.  
Table 3: Sample Profile 
Sample Profile 
Sector Frequency Percentage 
Agriculture 4 1.61 
Conglomerates 36 14.52 
Consumer 60 24.19 
Construction 12 4.84 
Health care 12 4.84 
ICT 12 4.84 
Industrial goods 40 1613 
Natural resources 8 3.23 
Oil and gas 20 8.06 
Services 44 17.74 
Total 248 100 
 
4.2 The Disclosure Scoring Index 
The transparency and disclosure attributes is divided into three sub-sets which are 
“transparency in ownership structure and investments with 11 attributes, financial transparency 
and information disclosure with 17 attributes and transparency in board and management 
structure and process with 14 attributes with a total of 42attributes. The index used in this 
research is “1” for disclosure and “0” otherwise. The essence of this method is to ensure 
objectivity, a score point is awarded for each criterion for a firm that meets it and zero for 
otherwise and not applicable(NA) for not meeting the criterion (Meek et al., 1995). 
4.3 Model Specification 
The following models are used to analyze the relationship between the various transparency 
variables and firm performance. 
Tobin Q = α0 + β1OWNTit+ β2FINTit +β3BODTit + FIMSIZ+є ……………………..1 
   ROA=    α0 + β1OWNTit+ β2FINTit +β3BODTit +FIMSIZ+ є ……………………..2 
Where: 
FP Firm performance: Tobin’s Q and ROA 
OWNT Ownership transparency 
 
 








BODT Financial transparency 
FINT Board process transparency 
FIMSIZ Firm size 
Є Error term 
 
Table 4: Operationalization of Variables 
Variables Acronyms Operationalization Authors 
Dependent Variables    
Tobin’s Q QRATIO This is the ratio of the market 
value of common shares, plus the 
total debt divided by the book 





Return on Assets (ROA) % ROA Earning before tax (EBT) divided 
by the total assets 
Haniffa and 
Hudaib, (2006) 
       Transparency  
1. ownership structure 
transparency  
2. financial transparency  
3. board and management 






Scoring index. It is dichotomous 
for 1 for disclosure  and 0 if 
otherwise 




















4. Results and Discussions 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics of the study variables. For the company transparency 
dimensions, the mean score of board (BODT) is 63% with a minimum of 14% and the maximum 
is 85%. The mean score of financial (FINT) is 68%, the minimum is 29% and the maximum is 
94%.  Lastly, for the ownership (OWNT) it has the mean score of 64%, the minimum is 18% and 
the maximum is 90%. In general, the mean score for transparency is low which about 60% is. 
This is an indication that serious compliance with the revise code of corporate governance and 














Table 5: Descriptive Statistics of Study Variable 
Variable Obs Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
      
OWNT 248 0.646628 0.150932 0.181818 0.909091 
BODT 248 0.635945 0.134799 0.142857 0.857143 
FINT 248 0.680029 0.137475 0.294118 0.941177 
FIMSIZ 248 16.08656 1.883399 11.49553 20.55272 
The correlation matrix for the dependent and continuous independent variables in table 6 below 
indicates there is no multicollinearity problem, as the correlations are less than 0.80 (Gujarati, 
2004). 
Table 6: The Correlation between Transparency and Firm Performance 
 
 OWNT BODT FINT Tobin’s 
Q 
ROA 
OWNT Pearson Correlation 1 
Sig. (1-tailed)  
N 248 
BODT Pearson Correlation .166*** 1 
Sig. (1-tailed) .004  
N 248 248 
FINT Pearson Correlation .547*** .195** 1 
Sig. (1-tailed) .000 .001  
N 248 248 248 
Tobin’
s Q 
Pearson Correlation .065 .119** .171*** 1 
Sig. (1-tailed) .156 .031 .004  
N 248 248 248 248 
ROA Pearson Correlation .012 .001 .130** -.029 1 
Sig. (1-tailed) .424 .496 .020 .324  
 248 248 248 248 248 
 
Level of significance = * 10%, **5%, ***1% 
 
4.2 Results Based on Tobin Q 
 Table 7 below reports the results from the regression analysis based on Tobin’s Q. The adjusted 
R2 for this model is 9% for the period of 2010-2013. Financial transparency (FINT) is found to 
positively relate to Tobin’s Q, but the relationship is not significant. This somehow indicates that 
companies will only disclose good news when there are making progress (Healy & Palepu, 
2001). The board process of transparency is positively significant at 1% with performance 
indicating that effective board process will report to the stakeholder the progress of the business 
which is in line with signaling theory. Ownership transparency (OWNT) is not significant with 














Table 7: Regression Analysis of Company Transparency and Tobin’s Q 
Tobins Q     .          Coef.    Std. Err z P>|z|    
BODT      .230    .087      2.63        0.01***      
FINT      .213    .180      0.236    1.18    
OWNT     .038   -.127 0.764     0.30    
FIMSIZ       -.002   .003 0.78     0.43 
_cons       .821 .098 8.34     0.00 
R-squared          =       0.0259 
   Wald chi2(4)       =      17.81 
Prob> chi2        =      0.0013 
Note N=148, Level of significance = * 10%, **5%, ***1% 
 
4.3 Results Based on ROA 
The table 8 below reports the results from the regression analysis based on ROA. The adjusted 
R2 for this model is 16% for the period of 2010- 2013.  In this model, financial transparency 
(FINT) is positively significant at 1% level with performance which is in consonant with Chiang, 
(2005). Also, board process transparency (BODT) is negatively significant at 1% level. However, 
ownership transparency (OWNT) is negatively significant with the ROA. The firm size is also 
found positively significant with ROA which is in line with the finding of Haniffa and Hudaib, 
(2006).  
Table 8: Regression Analysis of Company Transparency and ROA 
ROA              Coef.    Std. Err z P>|z|    
BODT      -.137    .043     3.18        0.01***      
FINT             .166 .050    3.30   0.00*** 
OWNT     -.060    .029    -2.03    0.04** 
FIMSIZ       .0191735    .001 12.83   0.00*** 
_cons       -.2270769    .0411766    -5.51     0.00 
         R-squared          =    0.1663 
 Wald chi2(4)       =    296.86 
Prob> chi2        =    0.0000 
Note N=148, Level of significance = * 10%, **5%, ***1% 
Conclusion and Future Research 
This paper examines the relationship between three transparency variables and firm 
performance variable namely, market and accounting returns which are represented by Tobin 
Qand ROA. The results based on market measure suggest that only the board is positively 
significant with performance. However, for accounting performance, the results suggest that 
financial and board processes are significant with performance. This signifies that the presence 
of transparency and disclosure of material information is important in firm performance. These 
 
 








findings is in line with Botosan and Harris, (2000), Chou and Gray (2002) and Meek et al., 
(1995) who suggest that improvement of firm transparency through quality disclosure  in the 
annual report can reduce information asymmetries. Furthermore, the study suggest that the SEC 
Nigeria to encourage companies to disclose more than the statutory requirements to send 
signals of performance to stakeholders. This research suggests that future researchers should 
investigate lapses in the legal framework on disclosure and transparency and include value 
added intellectual capital as measure of performance. 
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